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INTRODUCTION
The issues before the Court in this appeal are both simple and
straightforward:1
1. Is the exclusion clause in the Policy2 ambiguous?
2. Does the exclusion clause exclude coverage for the Oil?
3. Is S. W. Energy entitled to recover its attorneys' fees as a result of the
Insurers' denial of coverage?
The Insurers, in their Brief (the "Insurers' Brief), raise three main
arguments, designated as Points I through III.3 Points II and III address issues
which are not even before the Court on this appeal, and tend merely to obfuscate
the true issues.4 Furthermore, the Insurers' argument under their Point I is based
on fundamental misstatements of S. W. Energy's arguments and of the applicable
law, and is not supported by the case law cited by the Insurers.
x

See S. W. Energy Brief at 1.
Capitalized terms used in this Reply Brief have the same meanings as defined in S. W. Energy's initial Brief (the "S. W. Energy Brief).
3
These arguments are mischaracterized as "issues" at pages 1-2 of the Insurers' Brief.
4
In their "Statement of Undisputed Facts," in addition to restating the material facts already
set forth at pages 3-6 of the S. W. Energy Brief, the Insurers also add numerous additional
purported facts which are irrelevant to any issue before the Court on this appeal, some of
which are simply not accurate. However, since both the existence and accuracy of these additional "facts" are irrelevant to any issue involved in this appeal, S. W. Energy will not address the Insurers' "Statement of Undisputed Facts" further herein.
-1-

ARGUMENT
I.

Points II and III of the Insurers' arguments relate to issues which are
not even before the Court,
As described in greater detail in the S. W. Energy Brief, the Policy cov-

ered both the Tank and the Oil, and both the Tank and the Oil were lost when the
Tank failed. The complaint below included S. W. Energy's primary claim for
coverage for the Oil based on the plain language of the Policy, as well as alternative, secondary claims for coverage for the Oil based on theories of statutory and
common law fraud. The district court granted summary judgment to the Insurers' on all counts.
As clearly stated in the S. W. Energy Brief, in order to frame the central
legal issues of this case clearly on appeal and to avoid clouding those issues with
factual disputes relating to less important claims, S. W. Energy has elected not to
pursue the secondary claims raised by the original pleadings, but is pursuing only
its primary claim for coverage of the lost Oil, plus interest and attorneys' fees.5
Furthermore, while S. W. Energy does not agree with the Insurers' conclusion
about the nature of the damage to the Tank, the cost of retaining experts and
contesting that disputed factual question would have exceeded the value of both
-2-

the Tank and the Oil. S. W. Energy therefore never filed a claim, either directly
with the Insurers or in the case below, for the lost Tank. S. W. Energy does not
now seek recovery for the Tank in this appeal, and does not dispute the Insurers'
assertion that the damage to the Tank resulted from rust or corrosion.6
The dispute before this Court is not the factual question whether the Tank
rusted or corroded, but rather the legal issue whether the provision of the Policy
that excluded coverage of the Tank (assuming rust and/or corrosion) would also
have excluded coverage for the lost Oil. That issue must be decided based on the
language of the Policy (resolving any ambiguities in favor of coverage), without
deference to the trial court's decision granting summary judgment.
S. W. Energy has expressly waived its alternative statutory and common
law fraud theories originally asserted in the complaint, and S. W. Energy did not
argue that the Insurers had committed fraud in the S. W. Energy Brief. Virtually
all of the Insurers' argument under their Point II7 (that the Insurers are not guilty
of fraud or bad faith) is irrelevant to any issue involved in this appeal, and serves

5
6

See S. W. Energy Brief n. 4 at 3.

See S. W. Energy Brief n. 5 at 7-8, and accompanying text.
insurers' Brief at 29-33.
-3-

only to divert the time and attention of the Court and the parties away from the
real issues of the case. 8
The Insurers' Point III9 relates entirely to whether the supplemental affidavit of Richard P. Smoot and the declaration of Jim Pinneo (the "Affidavits")
should have been stricken by the trial court. 10 The Affidavits were submitted in
connection with S. W. Energy's memorandum opposing the Insurers' motion for
summary judgment for the purpose of demonstrating the substantial factual dispute over whether the hole in the bottom of the Tank had resulted from rust and
corrosion, as argued by the Insurers, or had been caused by a broken internal
weld, as observed by the affiants and shown by the photographs attached to the
Affidavits.

8

The only part of the Insurers' Point II which might even arguably be relevant is Point
11(A)(2) ("Fairly Debatable Issue"), which indirectly, at least, addresses the narrow contract
issue of whether S. W. Energy is entitled to recover its attorneys' fees because of the Insurers' breach of their implied duty of good faith under the Policy. To prevail on that claim,
S. W. Energy does not need to prove bad faith by the Insurers - only that they denied coverage where coverage was not "fairly debatable." See S. W. Energy Brief at 21-22. Coverage
is not "fairly debatable" merely because the Policy is susceptible of more than one interpretation. Id. at 23-24.
insurers' Brief at 34-38.
10
Mr. Smoot is the owner and President of S. W. Energy, and Mr. Pinneo is the field pumper. The Affidavits were not offered as expert testimony, but as statements of fact, based on
the affiants' personal observations, their extensive oil field experience and their personal familiarity with the Tank. R. 208-11, 219-20.
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A,

Misstatement No. 1: "Plaintiff [argnes] that the conflict between
the coverage and exclusionary clauses creates an ambiguity/5

The Insurers introduce their argument as to the correct interpretation of the
Policy's exclusion clause by materially mischaracterizing S. W. Energy's argument: "Plaintiff essentially argued that the conflict between the coverage and exclusionary clauses creates an ambiguity. . . . [P]laintiff s entire argument succeeds or fails based on plaintiffs own presumption that the alleged conflicts between the insuring clause and the exclusionary clause create ambiguity when applied to the facts." Insurers' Brief at 20, 22. The Insurers then cite Alf v. State
Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1993) ("Alf) for the proposition
that
'this logic would prevent application of any exclusion
since exclusions are necessarily inconsistent with coverage.' . . . [S]uch a ruling 'would render any exclusion
invalid simply because it conflicts with the stated coverage in some way.'
Insurers' Brief at 22 (quoting Alf at 1275, Insurers' emphasis omitted).
The Insurers are at least partly right: "Such a ruling" would render any
exclusion invalid. However, S. W. Energy does not seek "such a ruling."
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Energy does not argue that the Policy's exclusion clause is ambiguous merely because it is inconsistent with the insuring clause; S. W. Energy believes that the exclusion clause is not ambiguous at all
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direct losses." Id. (emphasis added).
The plain language of Policy belies the Insurers' argument: "This Policy
insures against direct physical loss of or damage to the property covered." Poln

The exclusion clause clearly defines the kinds of damage which are not covered, including
rust and corrosion. Thus a claim for rust or corrosion of the Tank would be excluded. The
exclusion clause does not, however, exclude a claim for the loss of the Oil, which was not
rusted or corroded. See S, W, Energy Brief at 1446.

icy, f4 (emphasis added). The exclusion clause does not "expressly limit itself
to direct losses for the simple reason that only "direct physical losses" are covered in the first place. It would have been meaningless to have added the word
"direct" to the exclusion clause, since indirect losses are not covered at all.13
C.

Misleading Statement No, 3: "[I]f applied only to the oil, the
policy exclusion would be meaningless.'5

The Insurers state, at page 26 of their brief, that, "if applied only to the
oil, the policy exclusion would be meaningless." While that statement may be
literally true, the Insurers' argument is disingenuous.
The exclusion clause does not "apply only to the Oil." The Policy covers
not only the Oil, but also the Tank and other equipment.

Different kinds of

property are susceptible to different kinds of damage. The Tank is subject to rust
and corrosion; the Oil is not. Of course the exclusion would be meaningless "if
applied only to the Oil." That is exactly the point. The exclusion of rust and
corrosion damage can only apply to the kinds of insured property which are susceptible to rust and corrosion, such as the steel Tank. That the exclusion does

12

See S. W. Energy Brief at 19-20.
See S. W. Energy Brief at 14-16.

13
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P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988).
S. W. Energy has in fact presented an interpretation of the Policy which is
not merely plausible, but compelling.14 S. W. Energy has not argued, and is not
14

See * w. Energy Brie'
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required to show, that "any differing opinion would be neither plausible nor
fairly debatable" - merely that its interpretation is plausible. Having met that
burden, the Policy must be construed in favor of coverage as a matter of law, and
the coverage cannot be "fairly debatable."15
E,

Misstatement No, 5: "[P]laintiff has failed to establish how [the
Insurers] should have been aware that [their] analysis of the specific policy language was incorrect or unreasonable."

Apparently recognizing that, upon analysis under governing Utah law,
coverage for the lost Oil is, in fact, not fairly debatable, the Insurers assert that
S. W. Energy "has failed to establish how CNA should have been aware that its
analysis of the specific policy language was incorrect or unreasonable." Insurers' Brief at 31.
This statement is both erroneous and misleading for two reasons. First,
S. W. Energy is not required to show that the Insurers' interpretation is unreasonable - only that S. W. Energy's interpretation is plausible.
Second, and more important, by certified letter dated April 10, 1996,
nearly four months before filing this action, counsel for S. W. Energy, in painstaking detail, not only spelled out the facts underlying S. W. Energy's claim, but
15

See S. W. Energy Brief at 23-24.
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Exchange, 888 P.2d 138, 141 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231
(Utah 1995).
Unlike the policy at issue in Alf, where the exclusionary language was
precise and all-encompassing, the Policy is at least ambiguous because its
exclusionary language is susceptible of more than one interpretation.
Both Alf and Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,
790 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1990) {"Village Inn"), which this Court followed in
deciding Alf, were earth movement exclusion cases where the insurer, State Farm,
preceded the list of exclusions in its policies with a so-called "lead-in clause." 17
The lead-in clause stated:

17

In Village Inn, the court of appeals emphasized that it was State Farm's use of the lead-in
clause which made its policy language clear and unambiguous:
This "lead-in" clause, apparently a relatively recent addition by State Farm in its
policies, clearly excludes from coverage any loss from earth movement, combined
with water, regardless of cause. . . . Since the exclusion is for earth movement
loss from any cause, we can only conclude earth movement encompasses both
natural and human processes. In view of the lead-in language, we hold that the
district court was correct in its interpretation that the policy was unambiguous and
coverage was excluded under the policy as a matter of law.
Village Inn at 583 (emphasis in the original; citations and footnote omitted).
This Court in Alf, in reviewing the court of appeals' analysis in Village Inn, made the following
observation: "State Farm denied coverage under a clause in the policy excluding coverage for
damage caused, either directly or indirectly, by earth movement." Alf at 1276 (emphasis
added). The Court in Alf, while reviewing a California federal district court's decision in
-12-

We do not insure under any coverage for any loss which would not
have occurred in the absence of one or more of the following excluded
events. We do not insure for such loss regardless of: (a) the cause of
the excluded event; or (b) other causes of the loss; or (c) whether
other causes acted concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded
event to produce the loss:
Alfat 1272 n.l. In short, the lead-in clause used by State Farm had the effect of
clearly and unmistakably communicating to the insured that there was no coverage
for loss resulting from earth movement, regardless of the cause of the earth
movement, whether there were other causes or "whether other causes acted
concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded event to produce the loss."
In marked contrast to the specificity and all-encompassing nature of State
Farm's lead-in clause, here the Insurers used no lead-in clause whatsoever. State
Farm's lead-in clause convincingly demonstrates that an insurer could use plain and
ordinary language to clearly and unmistakably communicate to its insured that
losses caused by corrosion or other specific causes, either directly or indirectly,
concurrently or in sequence with other causes, are not insured. The Insurers could
easily have eliminated any ambiguity in the Policy simply by using comparable lananother State Farm case, State Farm Fire & Cos. Co. v. Martin, 668 F. Supp. 1379 (CD. Cal.
1987), affd, 872 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1989)(applying California law), noted that the lead-in
clause was again determinative: "Again, the court interpreted the explicit terms of the lead-in
clause to deny coverage." Alfzi 1276.
-13-

guage. They failed to do so, and they cannot now rely on the wholly dissimilar exclusionary language of Alf to compensate for that failure.
CONCLUSION
S. W. Energy has clearly shown, and the Insurers have failed to refute,
that the exclusion clause in the Policy does not exclude coverage for the loss of
the Oil. Even if the clause had been ambiguous, the ambiguity must be resolved
in favor of coverage. Furthermore, since coverage is clear as a matter of law
when the applicable rules of construction are applied, the issue of coverage is not
"fairly debatable," and S. W. Energy is also entitled to recover its attorneys' fees
incurred as a result of the Insurers9 denial of S. W. Energy's legitimate claim.
Dated this 2nd day of October, 1998.

Robert P. Hill
John A. Adams
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Appellant S. W. Energy Corporation
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